A Conversation with Erdi Öztürk on Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey

I had a chance to meet Erdi Öztürk, doctoral candidate and research assistant at Strasbourg University, at BRISMES conference last week and talk to him about his research focus, on the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the foreign policy of Turkey.

He has recently published an article “Turkey’s Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?” in the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies which argued that Presidency of Religious Affairs, named Diyanet in Turkish, has been transformed into a “state apparatus” that moved towards applying“the political ideology of the ruling cadre”during the AKP era.

Öztürk's doctoral research is also about the role Turkey has adopted in the Balkan peninsula via its ideological state apparatuses. In this context, he examines the theories of secularization, Balkan history, the concepts of religion, hegemony, and soft power.

First, why are you interested in this topic / area and how did you start your research? What do you mean when you say diyanet is a “religious state apparatus” ?

I am interested in religion / state relations in Turkey, the role religion plays in Turkey and instrumentalization of religion in politics…

I got into this research arena setting because I am interested in these three themes. I personally do not come from a religious background. People are always thrilled about what they know less, aren’t they?

My interest in the subject grew through reading, my experiences, and then the learning process. I developed an interest in this particular institution. What was thrilling was that a country which proposed that it was secular had a persistent tendency to regulate the religious sphere that was in place since the Byzantine Empire.

I wanted to frame my research on this inspiring process.

Then I asked the question; “how can I frame this process and expand it?” First, I started my research on Diyanet and its role in domestic politics. However, I found the foreign policy aspect to be intriguing. How the issue became internationalized was highly important.

The argument of my thesis questions the idea that “states make their identity by interacting with each other and foreign policy becomes apparent relationally”. Even though this is, indeed, correct in many cases, it may not always be the case and the state, by itself, can construct a new identity and choose apparatuses to aid in its construction.

These can be foreign policy, national education and as we see in this case religious affairs. These apparatuses can make the new identity more visible.

My argument also proposes that Turkey has shifted its identity, and in this change, the state apparatus of Diyanet has a crucial role.

My theoretical framework comes from Althusser. Althusser defines the state as composed of an infrastructure made up from an economic base and a superstructure. The superstructure takes the form of different state apparatuses of both repressive and ideological nature. The repressive ones such as the army, the police and the judiciary, are agencies under direct state control, meant to impose the dominant ideology over the society by violence and coercion. The ideological ones are not directly under formal state control.

Nevertheless, they still serve to transform the society in line with state objectives by exercising non-coercive and indirect forms of social control (see Althusser 2014).

In this regard, since Diyanet is legally under state control, it cannot be defined as an ideological state apparatus. Nor can it be defined as a repressive state apparatus, as using violence by Diyanet would be inconceivable.

Yet, as specified by Ali Bardakoğlu (2004, 397-368), a former president of Diyanet; “it has a particular role in the production and transmission of religious knowledge… provides sound religious information”. However, Diyanet has also engaged in identity and ideology construction by forms of social control, such as issuing fatwas (Islamic legal opinions), on the one hand, and in providing intelligence for the national intelligence service on the other hand.

Therefore, it stands in between being an ideological and repressive state apparatus. Nevertheless, it has been always religion-driven, therefore, it would be suitable to define it as a religious state apparatus.

If we talk about the existence of Presidency of Religious Affairs since the Byzantine Era, what are the changes and continuities from the Byzantine to Ottoman, then to the Ottoman and the Republican eras?

This question is addressed clearly in İştar Gözaydın’s work and we build our work on her’s as a foundation. If only there were other good research on the topic...

In the Anatolian geography, the regulation of religion by the state is a tradition. As we all know that geography has gone through a number of transitions, but this tradition remained. For example, in the Ottoman era the office of Sheikh al-Islam was controlled by the palace and is utilized for its interest. When we come to the year 1923, while Turkey claimed that it had carried out a revolution, we see a continuity in state and religious affairs.

So, one can say that the renewal of the Diyanet is not a genuine development in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era. However, if we take the foundation of the institution as a basis, we see an increase in its leverage. The AKP merely experiences this momentum, but also makes it more visible.

For my study, I have calculated the total budget of the institution and compared it with the ratios to the general budget through time. Throughout these calculations I saw that from 1985 to 1989, the rule of Turgut Özal, the Diyanet got the largest share. The era, in which most of the mosques were built was not the AKP era, but the Özal era.

In the AKP era we observe that Diyanet is becoming multi-dimensional. There is a television channel called Diyanet TV today. The institution has its official university. Also, in the AKP era we see that its activities are becoming less regulated through legal arrangements.

Apart from this, through my meetings in Bulgaria, where I interviewed an important official from the Presidency, I saw that Diyanet has come to lead the role which embassies used to hold. This switch has taken place in countries where Muslims are a clear minority.

How has Diyanet transformed as an institution since the birth of the Turkish Republic ? How can we trace the changes through stages?

The birth of Diyanet in the Republican era comes from the desire of the elites to have a structured “system of state”, where the institution plays a crucial role. Republican elites knew that religion was important for Turkish society. They did do two things in their policies to utilize it. First, in order not to be challenged by it, they tried to take it under control. Secondly, by controlling it they wanted to have influence over the people.

When the institution was formed in 1924 it did not have a lot of power. Even though it has been a crucial institution, it was relatively weak. In the 1940s, it became the centre of debate between the Democratic Party (DP) and Republican People’s Party (CHP) and gained further importance. At this period, the ruling party (CHP) saw religion as a crucial aspect of gaining the share of votes and saw the Diyanet as an institution that is attached to the party.

After every military coup, including the coups of 1960 and 1980, we see an expansion of the roles of Diyanet. Diyanet gains the role to “enlighten” society via legal arrangements. After 1980, under the framework of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the institution gained the role to protect Turkishness. Also, in 1975 the Turkiye Diyanet Foundation was established. Since 1978, attachés around the world have been established, including Australia. That’s a bit far way, isn’t it? Also, after the Cold War, Turkey was invited to the Balkans. Some Balkan counties did so because they believed that; “a secular Turkey can educate our Muslims”.

When we look at the 2000s, the growth of Turkish economy is visible in diyanet as well and we see a huge institution that is scattered in various places. We even see some of applications in National Education being transferred to diyanet, which is quite irrelevant. It also exceeds its power by the cession of an Assyrian church.

In countries where Muslims are in the minority, is there any contestation between Gülen and the Diyanet ?

It is very hard to frame the Gülen-Turkey and Gülen- Diyanet relationship. There are a lot of changes that can be observed from one country to another. There are places where the Gülen movement is strong and other countries where the Diyanet is. Also, there are countries where both of them exist or only one of them exists.

I usually look at the Balkans. The reason why Turkey was invited to these countries was because it was understood as a “secular and reasonable” country. For example, this has been the case in Bulgaria. However, at the end of the 90s, Turkey couldn’t sustain its activities due to lack of resources. When we look at the indicators we see that there have been irregularities in the level of Turkey’s activities. In this context, the Gülen movement enters.

At the end of the 90s, we see both the Özal and Demirel governments adapting to the presence of the Gülenists. The Gülenists went to many places with references from Turkey. We also see that in 28th of February the state withdrew the activities of some communities (cemaatler) like the Gülen or Sūlaimānī Jamia ( Süleymancılar).

However, after 2002, when a new political elite with an Islamic identity enters the scene, the role of Diyanet expands. Also, economic growth contributes to the process. Since the 2000s, monetary aid has been extended. To note, this aid should not be perceived as corruption, as it is all in the records. What we are aware of is that there is a recorded 2 million Euros worth of aid, but also there are other forms of aid, under the name of donations, that come from the Diyanet Foundation. There are also other contributions intended to support courses that teach the Quran, supply religious books, and so on.

We see today the Turkish state and the AKP, which is now in control of the Turkish state, is imposing its world view. What does this cause? It means that other countries see Turkey in a different way. They view it as having left its secular identity and as pushing a new ethno-religious identity in these countries. They are other organisations like Yunus Emre, TİKA, Maarif Derneği that impose this agenda.

In your presentation you have used the speeches of the head of Diyanet. You have said that the incumbent head is more visible than the other presidents, as he posed with Erdoğan in the 15th of July rally and called for imams not to perform funeral players to people who are labelled as “terrorists/traitors". How do you think the leadership affects this process?

Mehmet Görmez is a more visible figure than the other historical presidents of Diyanet. He has an academic past. However, this change has not come with Görmez. There have been changes in the law since 2010 and especially since 2013.

We see that in the era of Davutoğlu, and under his idea of “strategic depth”, the Diyanet has become more powerful. For example, according to Davutoğlu, Diyanet has 5 missions; the first of them is to reach out to the Turkish diaspora, the second is to think of the welfare of Muslims; the others are enlarging the impact of Turkey in the international sphere and connecting with other cultures.

Even though we do not see Davutoğlu in domestic politics today, when we look at the events that Diyanet conducted in 2015, we see his political ideology vividly. This may not be the case in Syria or relations with US, however, “strategic depth” is still implemented in the Balkans.

As you have underlined in your presentation, can we say that Diyanet has been used as a tool in the transformation of Turkey to a “hegemonic party regime” under the AKP?

We are passing through interesting times. It is the first time since the early Republic that a political leadership has exercised such extensive dominance over state institutions. This dominance gives the leadership both space and “freedom”. The AKP historically comes from a split from one of the most powerful political Islamist organisation in Turkey. It has been the ruling party for almost 20 years and it does not seem like it is going to collapse in the short term. 16 percent of voters are AKP members. We have about 48 million voters. So the game starts 16 to 0. This is a crucial point to be remembered.

In my article last year, I proposed that Diyanet is an ideological state apparatus that encompasses the role of an imposer, promoter and protector. Therefore, when we look at these roles we see that the Diyanet is alternating between being a repressive and being an ideological state apparatus. It does not have an authority to punish but it can issue fatwas. And fatwas, in turn, are “recommendatory decisions” that have sanctioning effects on individuals.

Diyanet also does monetary aid. Albania is an interesting example of this aid. The Presidency of Religious Affairs in Albania and Turkey have a protocol that is in place since 2005, if I am not mistaken. After the Gülen-Erdoğan rift, some claim that the Albanian Diyanet is close to Gülen. I am not sure whether it is true or not. However, this perception led to the end of cooperation between the presidencies and the flow of money ceased. This monetary aid also shows that Diyanet is now a bit closer to the repressive apparatus. As we saw in the Anti-Coup Demonstrations at Yenikapı last year, the head of Diyanet came together with the head of military.

In sum, I can summarise, with its flows and particularities, Turkey had a secularism project. This project was not at all in harmony with minorities that were underlined in the Lausanne Treaty. This project did not eliminate religion. It was not blind to it, but it underlined the rule of law from time to time.

Today, it is hard to speak of a project of secularism.

Even though the Diyanet does not harm this project directly, it aids in the establishment of a religiously-centred agenda. In Bulgaria, the Diyanet attachés step into domestic politics. They talk with the imams and propagate the views of the AKP. In countries where the state and the church is strictly apart, you open the newspaper and find the Diyanet in the headlines. This does not provide a good image for Turkey.

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